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THE REASONABLENESS OF AESTHETIC ZONING IN
FLORIDA: A LOOK BEYOND THE POLICE POWER
RUSSELL P. SCHROPP
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the Supreme Court gave the green light to local gov-
ernments to use their police power' to zone land and control devel-
opment,2 a legal battle was beginning over the proper expanse of
this power. This battle has continued because, unlike other types
of delegated power, the scope of a local government's police power
is not marked by definite bounds. Nor is "the line which 'separates
the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power ... ca-
pable of precise delimitation.' ,,3
The problem of defining the scope of the police power appears to
have arisen from the standard used to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of ordinances enacted under that power. It is now well estab-
lished that such ordinances will be held invalid if they are "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."4 As one commen-
tator5 has noted, "health" and "safety" are fairly easy to define
and the promotion of morals has rarely been relied on to justify
land use controls. That has left local governments and the courts
to wrestle with the formidable problem of just what can be done
under the undefinable "general welfare," a problem which has been
the focus of much litigation over attempted land use regulation.
The problem courts have in dealing with the breadth' of the
1. "Police power is the inherent power which lies within the state and which enables the
legislature to enact laws regulating or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the
people." 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.01, at 2-2 (4th ed. 1982).
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.09, at 91 (2d ed. 1976), quoting, Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (emphasis added).
4. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395.
5. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General Welfare
and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603, 604 (1981).
6. But see C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CrY ZONING 98 (1979) (regulation of commercial
sex through zoning "has become a cause celebre in our cities").
7. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In a comment often cited for its sheer
eloquence as well as its implications for the police power, Justice Douglas remarked:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
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general welfare is compounded by its ability to change in response
to varying social and economic conditions, political trends and cul-
tural patterns.' One area of regulation which demonstrates both
the potential breadth of the police power and the ability of the
general welfare to respond to perceived social, political, economic,
and cultural needs is that of zoning for aesthetic purposes.9 While
it is sometimes said that all zoning is concerned with aesthetics to
a certain extent,1 this article will deal only with those regulations
in which the aesthetic concern is expressly recognized-either in
the ordinance or by the courts.1"
While the validity of zoning for aesthetics has been debated by
the courts in many states since the early 1900's and in Florida
since 1917,12 questions regarding the propriety of such zoning con-
tinue to surface with regularity. Two recent cases from Florida,
City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising Association 8 and La-
mar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, " and
one from the United States Supreme Court, Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego,'5 disposed of some issues, but indicated that
some very serious questions remain to be answered.'
8. State v. Houghton, 204 N.W. 569, 570 (Minn. 1925) (the police power, when exercised
for the "common" welfare, is quickly responsive to social and economic changes), aff'd, 273
U.S. 671 (1927); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1967) (zoning which enhances the
economic and cultural setting of the community is not necessarily invalid and the reasona-
bleness of such zoning varies in response to changed social attitudes, new knowledge, and
surrounding conditions); Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1971)
(validity of police power regulation dependent on responsiveness to prevailing morality and
public opinion). These descriptions of the police power help explain the frequency with
which different rules regarding the exercise of the police power evolve in different
jurisdictions.
9. The terms "aesthetic zoning" and "zoning for aesthetics" are used comprehensively in
this article to refer generally to local government regulations affecting aesthetics or enacted
primarily for aesthetic purposes, regardless of whether the regulation is actually a part of
the local government's zoning ordinance. Some state statutes are discussed as well. Of
course, the unifying thread running throughout all of the cases and regulations discussed
herein is the use of the police power to regulate for aesthetic purposes.
10. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 1, § 14.01, at 14-6.
11. A commonly cited colloquial definition of "aesthetic regulation" is a regulation di-
rected at some use which "is offensive to persons with sight but not offensive to a blind man
in a similar position." Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 223 (1955).
12. Anderson v. Shackelford, 76 So. 343 (Fla. 1917).
13. 414 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1982).
14. 415 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
15. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
16. The decision in Metromedia was decided by a plurality and left several critical ques-
tions unanswered including the issue of whether a total ban on billboards would be permis-
sible. The decision in Ormond Beach left unaddressed the issue of whether that city's ordi-
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All three of these recent cases dealt with local attempts to pro-
mote aesthetics through the regulation and control of billboards
inside city limits. While the range of activities, objects and uses
which local governments have attempted to regulate in the name
of aesthetics is itself broad, a cursory review of court decisions on
aesthetic zoning reveals that the most maligned objects during the
past seventy-five years have been billboards and signs.1 7 But these
have not been the only subjects of aesthetic regulation. A non-ex-
haustive list of such subjects would include junkyards, 5 architec-
ture,19 fences,2 0 clotheslines21 and trailers and recreational vehi-
cles.22 Aesthetics have also been involved in more traditional
nance infringed on first amendment free speech rights.
17. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.16, at 564; A. RATHKOPF, supra note 1,
§ 14.04, at 14-32. One of the first volleys in the aesthetic attack upon billboards was at issue
in Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74 N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905), where a city park
commission promulgated a rule forbidding the erection of any sign within such distance of a
park that its message was plainly visible from the park. In striking down the rule, the court
left little doubt that use of the police power had not yet extended to such frivolous entities
as beauty and good taste. Other cases struck down similar attempts to regulate billboards,
some of which imposed even more modest limitations upon the location of these structures
than the rule at issue in Commonwealth. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shackelford, 76 So. 343;
State v. Whitlock, 63 S.E. 123 (N.C. 1908).
The early aesthetic attacks on billboards were not without some success, however. As R.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.16, at 565, has noted, the decision in St. Louis Gunning Adver-
tising Co. v. St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S.
761 (1913), is credited with creating a doctrinal shift of sorts in the courts' view towards
regulations which had aesthetic implications. Relying upon the Supreme Court's two-year-
old decision in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), the court in St. Louis Gunning linked
the regulation at issue to a more traditional aspect of the police power (safety) and then
rationalized that the presence of aesthetic concerns would not invalidate an otherwise legiti-
mate exercise of the police power. After St. Louis Gunning, judicial decisions which linked
aesthetic regulations to some accepted police power objective became a regular occurrence
and a popular way to uphold such regulations in the face of constitutional challenges. Even
today, "most courts upholding ostensibly aesthetic regulation link aesthetics to another per-
missible police power purpose." Rowlett, supra note 5, at 611.
18. Rotenberg v. City of Ft. Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1967) (upholding junkyard ordi-
nance on aesthetic grounds); State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74 (N.C. 1959) (striking down fenc-
ing requirement for junkyards because it was enacted for aesthetic purposes).
19. City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 30 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1947) (ordinance
requiring architectural similarity did not promote health, safety, morals or general welfare);
Gates ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis.) (ordinance
establishing a board to review architectural appeal and functional plan of structures up-
held), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
20. City of Smyrna v. Parks, 242 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1978) (ordinance prohibiting chain link
fences while allowing other types was not clearly unreasonable).
21. People v. Stover, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (ordinance requiring a permit to hang a clothes-
line upheld on safety and aesthetic grounds), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
22. City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 357 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (ordinance prohibit-
ing the unenclosed parking of any trailer or boat struck down as not sufficiently related to
health, safety, or general welfare), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
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zoning concerns such as the separation of land uses" and height
and density restrictions.2 '
While the range of subjects which have become the focus of aes-
thetic regulation has grown over the years, so, too, has the variety
of views adopted by the courts regarding the validity of such regu-
lations. The initial, but now out-dated, view that aesthetics has no
part to play in the utilization of the police power no longer is fol-
lowed closely. In its place, the various state courts have subscribed
to basically three different positions on aesthetics, all of which al-
low local governments to address aesthetics to a varying degree
through the police power. These views include: (1) acceptance of
aesthetics as an auxiliary or incidental objective; (2) acceptance of
aesthetics as a primary objective, provided that the promotion of
aesthetics also promotes some non-aesthetic end which is a legiti-
mate concern of the police power; and (3) acceptance of aesthetics
as a legitimate objective of the police power. Section II of this arti-
cle will elaborate on the nature and constitutional implications of
each of these three judicial attitudes toward aesthetic zoning. In
Section III, Florida's evolution to its present position on aesthetic
zoning will be traced, beginning with the Florida Supreme Court's
1917 decision in Anderson v. Shackelford" and culminating with
that same court's 1982 decision in City of Lake Wales."
The bulk of this article, and its major focus, is contained in Sec-
tion IV. In that section an examination will be made of the various
limitations and restrictions which remain in regulating land use for
aesthetic purposes in Florida and many other jurisdictions even af-
ter the initial constitutional problem of finding a legitimate police
power objective has been overcome. As mentioned above, it ap-
pears that some degree of aesthetic regulation is possible under
each of the three major views currently endorsed by the various
courts. Nonetheless, aesthetic zoning ordinances are still subject to
the same limitations and restrictions as other zoning ordinances
and may not arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the rights of pri-
vate property owners in pursuit of their aesthetic objectives. In
23. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941) (upholding
ordinance which prohibited commercial uses along certain oceanfront property to preserve
the city's aesthetic appeal); Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d 499 (Inl.
1951) (zoning amendment designed to preserve a small area of single family use held invalid
as zoning for aesthetic purposes).
24. Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74 N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905).
25. 76 So. 343.
26. 414 So. 2d 1030 (1982).
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short, Section IV will examine the courts' analysis of what consti-
tutes a reasonable aesthetic zoning ordinance, an area which has
been cited as much in need of legal commentary."7 It is on this
question of reasonableness, and not on the legitimacy of using the
police power for aesthetic regulation, that future court decisions
are likely to focus-particularly in states such as Florida where
zoning solely for aesthetics is recognized as a legitimate objective
of the police power.
II. AESTHETICS AS A LEGITIMATE END OF THE POLICE POWER: A
MATTER OF DEGREE
The legitimacy of using the police power to achieve aesthetic
ends has generated a substantial amount of litigation in nearly
every state. As would be expected, this litigation has produced a
variety of views on the propriety of such regulation. However, it
now appears fairly certain in nearly all the states" that aesthetic
concerns can be addressed through police power restrictions in
some manner. If state courts will not allow regulation expressly or
primarily for aesthetic purposes, it is still possible to address aes-
thetic concerns in an incidental manner, tying them to regulations
which also address more traditional objectives of the police power.
In fact, no cases appear to hold a zoning ordinance invalid simply
because it incidentally addresses aesthetic concerns.29 Thus, "the
initial constitutional hurdle, the requirement of a permissible po-
lice power purpose, is usually overcome'so -although the height of
that hurdle will vary from state to state.
In general, it appears that the range of views adopted in the va-
rious states can be divided into three broad categories.8 1 The most
narrow view allows a regulation to address aesthetic concerns only
when such concerns are incidental to a more traditional objective
of the police power.8' Under this view, it is the fact that the ordi-
27. Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Author-
ize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. Rzv. 125, 130 (1980).
28. "[Tlen states have no reported case on aesthetic regulation at all." Id. at 127. There-
fore, it is impossible to say with certainty how these states would react once the issue is
presented. Nonetheless, it seems likely that one of the three major positions discussed in
this section of the article would be adopted.
29. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1241 (1968).
30. Rowlett, supra note 5, at 607.
31. This article presents only one of several possible ways of categorizing the views on
aesthetic regulations expressed by the various states. For other examples, see Bufford, supra
note 27; Rowlett, supra note 5; Annot., supra note 29.
32. Under this approach, a zoning ordinance regulating billboards could address aes-
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nance promotes the health, safety, morals or welfare of the com-
munity that makes it constitutional and the fact that aesthetic
concerns are also incidentally addressed does not render the ordi-
nance invalid. Needless to say, aesthetic concerns alone are not
considered sufficient under this analysis to justify an exercise of
the police power.
Under the second approach, promoting aesthetics is seen as a
legitimate goal of the police power only to the extent that the pro-
motion of aesthetics also promotes some non-aesthetic end which
is a recognized concern of the public health and safety or general
welfare. Thus, a city's aesthetic zoning regulation may be upheld,
not because it promotes beauty, but because in promoting beauty
it protects certain economic interests of the community such as
property values"3 or tourism, 4 both of which are considered legiti-
mate interests of the general welfare. While the aesthetic consider-
ations of such ordinances are primary and not auxiliary, it is the
impact of aesthetic zoning on these more traditional objectives of
the police power that preserves their constitutionality.
The third general view recognized by the courts, and recently
adopted in Florida,"3 is that zoning for aesthetic ends is legitimate
in and of itself. The view is based on a theory that aesthetics and
visual pollution are acceptable concerns of the general welfare:
The modern trend is to recognize that a community's aesthetic
well-being can contribute to urban man's psychological and emo-
tional stability. It is true that the question of what is beautiful
thetic considerations in an auxiliary capacity and only if the ordinance demonstrates a rea-
sonable relation to the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the community. Stoner McCray
System v. City of Des Moines, 78 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1956).
33. See, e.g., Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 586 P.2d 860 (Wash. 1978) (aesthetic
considerations of ordinance which prohibited mobile homes from areas zoned single-family
residential are legitimate in that they protect property values).
34. The early Florida cases provide clear examples of upholding basically aesthetic ordi-
nances on the grounds that they promote tourism. See City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
1960). In a more recent case, the California Supreme Court noted that "[b]ecause this state
relies on its scenery to attract tourists and commerce, aesthetic considerations assume eco-
nomic value" and support the regulation of billboards. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Di-
ego, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
35. City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising Ass'n, 414 So. 2d 1030. Even prior to the
decision in Lake Wales, several commentators cited Florida as having adopted the modern
view that zoning solely for aesthetics was a proper exercise of the police power. See Bufford,
supra note 27, at 134; Annot., supra note 29, at 1236. However, it appears more likely that,
prior to Lake Wales, Florida's position was probably best characterized as approving of
primarily aesthetic regulation provided it accomplished some legitimate non-aesthetic end,
such as the enhancement of tourism or protection of property values.
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and pleasing is for each individual to decide. We should begin to
realize, however, that a visually satisfying city can stimulate an
identity and pride which is the foundation for social responsibil-
ity and citizenship. These are proper concerns of the general
welfare."
Thus, it appears that some quantum of aesthetic regulation is
possible no matter which view a state subscribes to, 7 although the
degree of acceptance of aesthetic concerns is certainly variable.
Some authors8 have suggested that it makes little difference which
view is adopted as far as justifying the exercise of the police power
is concerned, and to a certain extent this appears true.3' But while
it may not matter which view a state adopts in order to relate aes-
thetics to the police power, such is certainly not the case when
courts evaluate the reasonableness of an ordinance in view of its
restrictions on private property rights. When a court weighs the
competing considerations of an ordinance which promotes certain
public benefits while at the same time restricting private property
rights, the existence of non-aesthetic concerns promoted by the or-
dinance obviously will be of some aid in justifying greater restric-
tions. Thus, a billboard ordinance which compels the immediate
removal of nonconforming billboards might be more tolerable if it
promotes both safety and aesthetic concerns as opposed to just
aesthetics. Such a severe infringement on private property might
be intolerable for mere aesthetic reasons."0 Likewise, an ordinance
36. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 199 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
37. For a brief discussion of each state's position on zoning for aesthetics, see Bufford,
supra note 27.
38. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 1, § 14.01[2], at 14-16; Rowlett, supra note 5, at 608-09.
39. Whether a regulation is upheld solely on the basis of aesthetics or because it also
promotes some non-aesthetic objective may be of little significance because the "court is in
fact upholding it indirectly on the basis of all the values contributed by it and on the basis
of whatever elements of zoning are included in the word 'appearance.'" A. RATHKOPF, supra
note 1, § 14.01121, at 14-16 (emphasis added). This appears to be particularly true when a
primarily aesthetic ordinance is upheld on the grounds that it promotes some legitimate
non-aesthetic goal, even though the relationship between that goal and the ordinance is
somewhat tenuous. Since such ordinances are cloaked with a presumption of constitutional-
ity, the party seeking to invalidate the ordinance faces the difficult task of proving that the
ordinance is not rationally related to the non-aesthetic goal. The end result is that ordi-
nances which are, in fact, based solely or primarily on aesthetics are found to be enacted for
valid police power purposes. Some courts are openly cognizant of this end run around the
police power. See City of Smyrna v. Parks, 242 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1978), in which the court
upheld a primarily aesthetic ordinance on the basis of a tenuous relationship to safety and a
virtually unprovable relationship to the protection of property values.
40. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439
U.S. 809 (1978).
1982]
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regulating fences which was enacted primarily for aesthetic reasons
might be able to sustain greater restrictions on property rights if
some safety concerns are also addressed in the ordinance."1
While the thrust of this article deals with the problems which
may be encountered even after the concept of aesthetic zoning is
determined to be a legitimate exercise of the police power, it is
important to recognize the different views on aesthetic zoning held
throughout the states. While aesthetics in general may be pro-
moted through the police power, specific ordinances which address
aesthetic concerns may fail in less lenient states because they do
not have an underlying relation to a more traditional police power
objective. The issue of whether a particular aesthetic ordinance is a
justifiable exercise of the police power is certainly not beyond chal-
lenge. Depending upon the jurisdiction and the intent of the ordi-
nance (both express and implied), it seems clear that some aes-
thetic regulations may not be viewed as a legitimate exercise of the
local police power.
Moreover, the views on aesthetic regulation are constantly
changing. As the following discussion of Florida case law indicates,
it is not uncommon for state law in this area to experience an
evolution of sorts, during which time a state's position on the issue
may be somewhat ambiguous. A city seeking to regulate aesthetics,
or a property owner seeking to invalidate an ordinance as an im-
permissible use of the police power, may therefore wish to address
all three positions in order to afford the court a basis for uphold-
ing, or invalidating, the ordinance no matter which view it eventu-
ally subscribes to.
III. AESTHETIC ZONING IN FLORIDA
That the role aesthetics should play in zoning in Florida was am-
biguous for most of this century is evident in many of the zoning
decisions dealing with aesthetic concerns.' This ambiguity proba-
bly is indicative of a steady, if slow, evolution from unacceptance
of aesthetic considerations to a limited approval of zoning for aes-
thetics and, finally, to recognition of zoning for aesthetics as "an
idea whose time has come."'
As noted earlier, the first case to address the issue of aesthetic
41. City of Smyrna v. Parks, 242 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1978).
42. See Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611; Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach,
147 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).
43. City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising Ass'n, 414 So.2d at 1032.
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regulation in Florida appears to be Shackelford," a case which did
more than its share to fuel the controversy surrounding aesthetic
zoning in later cases. In Shackelford, the court dealt with a Lake
City ordinance which declared certain billboards and other adver-
tising surfaces to be nuisances and provided penalties for their
erection and maintenance. Defendant Anderson was cited for vio-
lating the ordinance for painting a sign on the side of a building
advertising the occupant's business. According to the court, "the
sign was neither dangerous to persons using the streets nor to adja-
cent property, nor offensive to their morals, although the words,
design, and coloring of the sign might offend the aesthetic tastes of
some of its citizens. ' '45 After reversing the lower court on unrelated
grounds, the supreme court turned to the issue of aesthetic regula-
tion under the police power. In remarks that were later character-
ized as a mere "gratuitous expression '"46 and "obiter dictum,"' 7 the
court commented:
In so far as the city undertakes to regulate the erection or con-
struction of billboards that might be dangerous to the public
.... ,it has the power; but to attempt to exercise the power of
depriving one of the legitimate use of his property merely because
such use offends the aesthetic or refined taste of other persons is
quite another thing, and cannot be exercised under the Constitu-
tion, forbidding the taking of property for a public use without
compensation. 41
This dictum in Shackelford did not prevent the Florida courts
from taking a more positive view towards aesthetic zoning in later
cases. In City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.,49 the court
recognized that a community's existing aesthetic appeal could pro-
vide a justification for zoning that was designed to protect and per-
petuate its attractiveness. The court upheld the city's zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting commercial uses along certain oceanfront
property, noting that the ordinance preserved the aesthetic appeal
of the community and provided "a distinct lure to the winter trav-
eler."50 More importantly from a legal standpoint, for the first time
44. 76 So. 343.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d at 614.
47. Id. at 615 (Thornal, J., dissenting).
48. 76 So. at 345.
49. 3 So. 2d 364.
50. Id. at 367.
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the court linked aesthetic concerns directly to the promotion of the
general welfare. While Ocean & Inland did not exactly embrace
the use of zoning to promote any aesthetic concern in any manner,
it is clear that the decision cracked the door to allowing considera-
tion of such concerns.
Later decisions opened the door even further. Courts used ratio-
nale similar to that in Ocean & Inland to hold that "aesthetic con-
siderations could be just cause for regulating signs in Sarasota in-
asmuch as the city was of the same character as Miami Beach," 61
and that junkyards in the city of Ft. Pierce could be required to
erect visual barriers since that city was "no less an attraction to
tourists for its aesthetic qualities than the cities of Miami Beach
and Sarasota. '52 Other cases added Daytona Beach" and Vero
Beach54 to the list of tourist areas where the regulation of aesthet-
ics was justified, prompting one commentator to remark that the
judicial designation of the entire state as a tourist area would seem
to be the most likely way to accomplish statewide acceptance of
aesthetic zoning.55
Practically speaking, these decisions indicated that local govern-
ments in Florida could enact aesthetic regulations so long as the
promotion of aesthetics also promoted tourism or protected the
city's economic interest in the tourist industry. At least one later
case found that the protection of property values through the pro-
motion of aesthetics could also provide a constitutional basis for
exercise of the local police power in Florida.5 6 Although at times
these cases implied a more primary role for aesthetics in the exer-
cise of the police power, none of the cases expressly upheld an or-
dinance solely on its ability to promote aesthetics without at least
a purported positive impact on some recognized aspect of the gen-
eral welfare.
While some later cases57 approved of aesthetic zoning ordinances
51. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d at 614.
52. Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d at 786.
53. Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach, 147 So. 2d 598.
54. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
55. Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 430,
439 (1965).
56. City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
57. See, e.g. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971) (preservation of
scenic surroundings sufficient to uphold ordinance requiring gas stations to be located 350
feet apart); International Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 90 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1956) (preserva-
tion of city's attractiveness sufficient to allow enforcement of ordinance regulating signs for
accessory uses); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953) (aesthetic grounds sufficient to
allow restriction on size of commercial signs); City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.
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with almost routine reliance on these earlier cases, there also have
been some queries and setbacks for other aesthetic regulations. A
common thread running through these decisions striking down aes-
thetic regulations appears to be the presence of a discriminatory
approach on the face of the regulation. For example, in Sunad,
Inc. v. City of Sarasota,"8 the supreme court reversed a district
court decision upholding a city ordinance which prescribed differ-
ent size standards for signs erected at the "point of sale" and those
erected elsewhere.59 After noting its support for aesthetic zoning in
"proper" situations, the court struck down the ordinance for fail-
ing to define "a pattern calculated to protect and preserve the
city's beauty." 60
Subsequent decisions affirmed the holding in Sunad to the effect
that aesthetic regulations must treat like subjects alike and may
not apply different standards based upon location, subject matter,
type of business, or other suspect criteria. In Abdo v. City of Day-
tona Beach,6 ' the district court of appeal invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting signs which advertised rates for motels and other types
of lodging houses, but did not similarly restrict restaurants, gas
stations and other businesses from exhibiting their prices. Citing
the supreme court's decision in Sunad, the court found it difficult
to believe that the ordinance would promote a pattern calculated
to preserve the city's beauty: "For aught that appears, compliance
with the ordinance could be effected by the unaesthetic expedient
of throwing a bucket of paint over that part of the sign having to
do with rates. '62 Likewise, in City of Naples v. Polk,63 enforcement
of an ordinance which prohibited all off-site (non-point of sale) ad-
vertising signs was enjoined as unconstitutional.
It was within this framework of limited acceptance for aesthetic
zoning that the Florida courts approached the most recent battles
over the regulation of outdoor advertising in Lake Wales. This liti-
gation began after the city amended its sign ordinance in 1978 to
effectively prohibit all off-premises signs. Lamar sued for the issu-
ance of a permit to erect a billboard and the trial court held the
2d 681 (Fla. 1949) (zoning designed to perpetuate city's aesthetic appeal upheld).
58. 122 So. 2d 611, rev'g, 114 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959).
59. Wall signs erected at point of sale were unrestricted in size; however, for non-point
of sale locations, wall signs were limited to 300 square feet and all other signs (e.g., bill-
boards) were limited to 180 square feet.
60. 122 So. 2d at 615.
61. 147 So. 2d 598.
62. Id. at 603.
63. 346 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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ordinance unconstitutional." The city amended its ordinance
again, establishing standards which differentiated between on-site
and off-site signs, and the two parties submitted the new ordinance
to the trial court by stipulation. Again the trial court found it un-
constitutional and this time the city appealed. Solely on the basis
of the supreme court's decision in Sunad, the appellate court af-
firmed. However, the appellate court also took note of "the trend
toward acceptance of regulatory distinction between billboards and
on-site advertising signs" 5 which was occurring in other jurisdic-
tions, and certified to the supreme court the question of whether
such distinctions were constitutional. In reversing the decision of
the district court of appeal, the supreme court receded from its
holding in Sunad: "Cities have the authority to take steps to mini-
mize sight pollution and, if in doing so they find it reasonably nec-
essary to make a distinction between on-site and off-site signs,
there is no constitutional impediment."""
After the decision in Lake Wales, the general implication ap-
pears to be a whole-hearted endorsement of the use of a city's zon-
ing power to regulate for aesthetic purposes. The court has recog-
nized that "[z]oning solely for aesthetic purposes is an idea whose
time has come."' 67 The key word here is "solely": No longer must
the ordinance directly promote tourism, protect property values or
promote some other aspect of the general welfare in order to be
considered constitutional. Aesthetics qua aesthetics is now a recog-
nized aspect of the general welfare and a legitimate objective of the
police power in Florida.
Of course, it would be a mistake to think that every use of the
police power for every aesthetic purpose will be viewed with ac-
ceptance. In this regard, Lake Wales is not helpful. The court im-
plied that there was an aesthetic difference between on- and off-
site signs that made the ordinance reasonable, but it did not spec-
64. The question of whether such an ordinance is actually unconstitutional has not been
definitively addressed by the Florida Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court. But
see Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So.2d 1312, where an
ordinance banning all off-site advertising was upheld. Plaintiff in Ormond Beach was a large
multi-state advertising company that did less than one percent of its business in Ormond
Beach. The court held that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of showing that the ordi-
nance exceeded the scope of the police power by severely "crippling" its business.
65. 399 So. 2d at 987.
66. 414 So. 2d at 1032.
67. Id., quoting, Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 324 A.2d 113, 119 (N.J.
Super Ct. Law Div. 1974).
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ify what that difference was.68 Moreover, the very fact that cities
must "find it reasonably necessary to make a distinction between
on-site and off-site signs" 69 implies that some aesthetic regulations
may not be valid exercises of the police power.
The reasonableness of aesthetic zoning ordinances is likely to be
the focus of future decisions in Florida. However, except for those
cases discussed above which debated the reasonableness of the dis-
tinction between on-site and off-site signs, the courts in Florida
generally have had neither the opportunity nor the impetus to ad-
dress some of the more likely questions to arise regarding the rea-
sonableness of aesthetic zoning. Can a city effectively prohibit all
off-site advertising, as Lake Wales had initially attempted to do?
Can a city require the removal of unaesthetic structures within a
given time period and, if so, what is a reasonable period of abate-
ment? What standards, if any, need to be specified in the ordi-
nance in order to insulate it from charges of arbitrary and capri-
cious enforcement? It is problems such as these that courts in
Florida are likely to be faced with in the future, and it is to these
problems that this article now turns. By evaluating applicable
Florida law and relevant cases from other jurisdictions, some in-
sight may be gained into what factors are important in evaluating
the reasonableness of aesthetic regulation and what arguments are
likely to be successful in upholding or invalidating aesthetic
ordinances.
IV. REASONABLENESS: THE TALISMAN OF ALL ZONING
Once a zoning ordinance has been "[flreed of the necessity of
discovering a relation to some standard component of the police
power, ' '70 the focus of the courts often shifts to other problems of
constitutional magnitude. Billboard and sign ordinances, for exam-
ple, are particularly vulnerable to first amendment free speech vio-
lations. 1  More commonly, zoning ordinances of all
68. But see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490; Lamar-Orlando Out-
door Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So. 2d 1312. See also infra note 83.
69. 414 So. 2d at 1032 (emphasis added).
70. R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.25, at 596.
71. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981), has shown very clearly that first amendment free speech concerns are very
much alive in attempts to regulate and prohibit billboards. At issue in Metromedia was an
ordinance that had the net effect of (1) allowing on-site advertising of goods and services
available on the property, (2) prohibiting all off-site advertising, and (3) prohibiting all non-
commercial advertising unless it fell within one of twelve exceptions to the ordinance. Me-
tromedia challenged the ordinance as an abridgement of free speech, asserting "that the city
1982]
454 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:441
types-including aesthetic regulations-are subjected to judicial
scrutiny for the reasonableness with which they attain their bene-
fits for the common welfare at the expense of restricting the ways
in which private property may be used.7" This balancing of public
benefits against private restraints is, at least in theory, a very diffi-
cult test to apply in this area of zoning due to the difficulty of
assigning a value or weight to aesthetic considerations. Nonethe-
less, as courts have come to accept zoning for aesthetics as a legiti-
may bar neither all off-site commercial signs nor all noncommercial advertisements and that
even if it may bar the former, it may not bar the latter." 453 U.S. at 504.
The plurality's discussion of the ordinance basically centered around two issues: (1)
whether an ordinance which allows on-site commercial advertising but prohibits off-site
commercial advertising is a constitutionally valid restriction on commercial speech, and (2)
whether an ordinance which provides greater freedoms for commercial speech than for non-
commercial speech is a constitutionally valid restriction on noncommercial speech. In ad-
dressing the impact of the ordinance on commercial speech, the plurality noted that it tradi-
tionally has afforded commercial speech a lesser degree of protection than noncommercial
speech, and proceeded to uphold the ordinance's restriction on off-site commercial speech.
The impact of the city's ordinance on noncommercial speech did not fare quite as well. In
effect, the plurality held the ordinance unconstitutional because it afforded greater protec-
tion to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech and was, therefore, and inversion
of typical first amendment values: "[T]he city may not conclude that the communication of
commercial information ...is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial
messages." 453 U.S. at 513 (footnote omitted).
Although billboard banning has been the most fruitful area of aesthetic regulation with
regard to free speech claims, other types of aesthetic regulation are not immune to first
amendment considerations. For example, several local ordinances adopted in New Jersey
which sought to restrict the utilization of "for sale" and "sold" signs in residential areas
were found to have run afoul of the first amendment. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Berg Agency v. Township of Maplewood, 395 A.2d 261
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). Perhaps the most unusual first amendment claim to arise
in response to an ordinance enacted for aesthetic purposes occurred in People v. Stover, 240
N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). In that case, Stover had erected a series
of clotheslines in his front and side yards which were adorned with old clothing, rags, under-
wear, and other assorted apparel to express his displeasure with the high taxes imposed by
the city. When the city passed an ordinance prohibiting the erection and maintenance of
clotheslines in a front or side yard, Stover objected to this curtailment of his nonverbal tax
protest. The court upheld the ordinance, noting that a city may proscribe a form of expres-
sion that works an injury to property; in this regard, it was obvious to-the court "that the
value of [the] 'protest' lay not in its message but in its offensiveness," Id. at 740, and would
undoubtedly serve to injure property values.
For a more detailed discussion of aesthetic regulation and its effect on free speech, see
Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1977); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 211-21
(1981); Comment, Constitutional Law: Billboards, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 672 (1982); Note, The Media Win the Battle, but Metro
Wins the War: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 493 (1981); Note,
10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 125 (1982).
72. R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.25, at 594; A. RATHKOPF supra note 1, § 14.01, at 14-
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mate use of the police power, the focus of their attention has
turned to just such an evaluation.
As the following sections of this article illustrate, there are many
pitfalls into which an aesthetic zoning ordinance may fall. How-
ever, such ordinances are generally given a better than average
chance of being upheld by virtue of three widely recognized police
power doctrines.7 3 First of all, a zoning regulation cannot be de-
clared unconstitutional unless it is clearly arbitrary and capri-
cious. 7 4 Secondly, such ordinances are entitled to a presumption of
validity, a presumption "which shifts the burden to the party at-
tacking an ordinance to show its invalidity. 7 5 And third, if the va-
lidity or reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable,
the court should defer to legislative judgment.7 6 These principles
go a long way towards upholding many otherwise questionable zon-
ing ordinances; however, as the following discussion indicates, they
do not render local zoning ordinances immune to attack.
A. Reasonableness Vis-a-Vis the Location and Character of
Development
The standard of "reasonableness" is very flexible and can be
used to invalidate zoning ordinances in a number of ways, some of
which are discussed elsewhere in this article. Of primary concern in
this section is the reasonableness of aesthetic regulation as it ap-
plies to the character and location of development.
In its simplest definitional form, aesthetic regulation is regula-
tion which seeks to improve or enhance the beauty or appearance
of an area. Whether a regulation actually accomplishes this goal is
often a function of (1) the location of the restricted structures or
uses, (2) the character of existing development at that location,
and (3) the character of development proscribed by the regulation.
It is, therefore, difficult to divorce a particular aesthetic regulation
from its surroundings when evaluating its reasonableness. Such
was obviously the case in People v.Goodman,77 a case in which the
reasonableness of a very restrictive sign ordinance was at issue.78
73. See Bufford, supra note 27, at 129.
74. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395.
75. See Bufford, supra note 27, at 129; see, e.g., Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401 (N.J.
1955).
76. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 388; Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d
820 (Fla. 1965).
77. 338 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972).
78. The ordinance limited commercial signs to four square feet in size and provided a
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The ordinance had been enacted by a small village located within a
designated national seashore, a location the court was quick to rec-
ognize for its uniqueness and sensitivity.
In assessing the reasonableness of such legislation, we may prop-
erly look to the setting of the regulating community ... Indeed,
regulation in the name of aesthetics must bear substantially on
the economic, social and cultural patterns of the community...
[and] fit the rather unique cultural character and natural features
of the area.7 9
Given the unique character of the area, the court found the sign
ordinance to be a reasonable attempt to protect the appearance
and character of the community.
In regulating some aspect of development in the name of aes-
thetics, it appears necessary to place similar burdens on property
which is similarly situated. 80 One of the key questions in this re-
gard is whether two parcels are, in fact, situated similarly. This
question has been the focus of several cases in Florida and else-
where in which sign ordinances that made a distinction between
on-site and off-site signs81 were evaluated for their reasonableness.
While some earlier cases invalidated ordinances making such a dis-
tinction as failing to define "a pattern calculated to protect and
preserve the city's beauty,"8' the more recent cases have tended to
uphold the distinction for various reasons.s While the distinction
two-year abatement period for existing nonconforming signs.
79. 338 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
80. Vieux Carre Property Owners & Assocs., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 167 So. 2d 367
(La. 1964) (city could not regulate one part of an historic district and exempt another part
when both sections had structures of similar architectural and historical significance).
81. Also referred to in some decisions as "point of sale" and "non-point of sale" signs,
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, and as "accessory" and "non-accessory"
signs, Cromwell v. Ferrier, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
82. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d at 615.
83. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, provides some indication of why the distinction between on-site and off-site signs
is appropriate:
In the first place, whether on-site advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition
of off-site advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety
and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive
because it permits on-site advertising. Second, the city may believe that off-site
advertising with its periodically changing content, presents a more acute problem
than does on-site advertising. . . .Third,. .. the city could reasonably conclude
that a commercial enterprise-as well as the interested public-has a stronger in-
terest in identifying its place of business and advertising the products or services
available there than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of
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between off-site and on-site signs has received the most attention
from both local governments and the courts concerning potentially
unreasonable distinctions, other distinctions regarding both the
character and location of signs also are possible and are not im-
mune to judicial scrutiny."'
A regulation which attempts to place an aesthetic restriction
over an area which already has a large number of nonconforming
structures would also appear to be unreasonable. Such was the case
in Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh,5 where the borough passed
two ordinances which related to architectural design and review.
The first ordinance required new residential dwellings to exhibit
an early-American type of design, while the second ordinance ef-
fectively prohibited flat-roofed dwellings. Plaintiff sought to build
a modern flat-roofed house and challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinances on several grounds, most of which went unad-
dressed by the court.8 However, the court did order a permit is-
sued since denial would be "clearly and palpably unreasonable in
light of the actual physical development of the municipality.' '87 In
support of its conclusion, the court noted that the most recently
built dwellings in the borough were of a modern design, many
older structures had additions which had flat roofs and within a
advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere . . . .Thus, off-site commer-
cial billboards may be prohibited while on-site commercial billboards are
permitted.
Id. at 511-12. Shortly after Metromedia was decided, the Florida Supreme Court receded
from its earlier position that the distinction between off-site and on-site signs is unreasona-
ble and held the distinction valid in Lake Wales. Soon after that, in Ormand Beach, a
Florida appellate court elaborated on the differences between off-site and on-site signs
which make the distinction a reasonable one. In addition to the differences noted above
which were recognized in Metromedia, the court in Ormond Beach observed that (1) on-site
businesses had already been constructed and the addition of a sign would not have as big an
impact when compared to an off-site sign; (2) off-site signs were taking advantage of and
intruding upon the vision of passersby rather than exercising a right associated with the
land; and (3) on-site signs were simply more tolerable because they contributed to the busi-
ness on the premises. 415 So.2d at 1316-19.
84. For example, an ordinance could provide different standards for commercial, office
and institutional uses, or could distinguish between different types of commercial activities.
In this regard, see Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach, 147 So. 2d 598, in which an ordinance
that regulated outdoor signs advertising room rates for lodging establishments but did not
affect other businesses was found unreasonable and discriminatory. See also Hiway Ads,
Inc. v. State, 356 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App. 1977), where the court rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment that a distinction between signs erected along federal highways and other signs was
arbitrary.
85. 150 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
86. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text for discussion of plaintiff's claims re-
lating to inadequate standards of review.
87. 150 A.2d at 66.
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short distance of plaintiff's property were many modern structures
with flat roofs. Thus, the prohibitions on future development man-
dated by the ordinances were clearly unreasonable in light of the
character of existing development.8"
In a similar vein, an aesthetic regulation which imposes like re-
strictions on all areas regardless of its aesthetic impact on certain
sub-areas may be found to be unreasonably related to the promo-
tion of aesthetics. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, "the quantum of improve-
ment will obviously vary with the site involved."89 In this regard,
courts sometimes distinguish commercial and industrial districts
from other types of areas, rationalizing that a regulation affecting
one aspect of aesthetics (e.g., billboards) may be a mere drop in
the bucket in a very unaesthetic industrial or commercial district.
This was the basis of Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Me-
tromedia"0 in which San Diego's ban on billboards was struck
down as violative of free speech. According to Justice Brennan:
A billboard is not necessarily inconsistent with oil storage tanks,
blighted areas, or strip development . . [B]efore deferring to a
city's judgment, a court must be convinced that the city is seri-
ously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with re-
spect to its environment. Here, San Diego has failed to demon-
strate a comprehensive coordinated effort in its commercial and
industrial areas to address other obvious contributors to an unat-
tractive environment. 1
Justice Brennan also cited at length from a concurring opinion
in John Donnelly which noted that "signs and billboards are but
one of countless types of man-made intrusions' 91 in industrial and
commercial areas. The problem, as envisioned in these opinions, is
one of underinclusiveness. While a city is definitely not required to
address all aesthetic concerns at the same time, these opinions
would place a burden on the city to demonstrate a comprehensive
commitment to aesthetic improvement and not just an effort to rid
the community of a single annoying source of ugliness. If the city
88. See also Fulling v. Palumbo, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967) (ordinance creating minimum
lot size of 12,000 square feet was unreasonable in neighborhood where 75 per cent of all lots
were less than 12,000 square feet).
89. 639 F.2d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981).
90. 453 U.S. at 521 (1981).
91. 453 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. 639 F.2d at 23 (Pettine, J., concurring).
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cannot meet this burden, the ordinance would fail the test of being
reasonably related to the promotion of aesthetics.
In addition to the problem of underinclusive efforts to regulate
aesthetics, a city must also be aware of the problems of overinclu-
siveness as regards restrictions on the location or character of de-
velopment. As the court noted in J.D. Construction Corp. v. Board
of Adjustment, "[t]he regulation must be reasonably calculated to
meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect
uses which do not have the offensive character of those which
caused the problem"93 addressed by the regulation. At issue in J.D.
Construction was a parking ordinance which restricted front-yard
parking facilities. After recognizing that the purpose of the ordi-
nance was aesthetic in nature and designed to preserve property
values, the court held the ordinance inapplicable to multi-family
development: "While the restriction may bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to such a purpose as applied to single-family residences in
a single-family residential district, it bears no such relationship as
applied to garden apartment complexes. 9 4 As such, the ordinance
was overinclusive, restricting more than was necessary to achieve
its aesthetic objectives.
In sum, the regulation in question must be reasonably calculated
to achieve its aesthetic objectives given both the location and char-
acter of development. Not only may a local government find it use-
ful to draw regulations which are tailored to the industrial section,
the historical section or to the architectural characteristics of an
area, it may well find it necessary to do so if it is to pass the test of
being reasonably related to the promotion of aesthetics in a certain
area.
B. Failure to Establish Adequate Standards
Often, police power regulations which require permitting or
some other form of case-by-case evaluation necessitate that the
evaluation of the proposed development be conducted by a local
administrative or legislative body. When this occurs, it is necessary
generally for the ordinance to specify clear and reasonable stan-
dards by which the local body may conduct its review. This is par-
ticularly true in the area of aesthetic regulation since aesthetics are
often cited as being subjective and not capable of reduction to ob-
93. 290 A.2d 452, 455 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
94. Id. at 458.
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jective criteria.95
When standards for aesthetic concerns are properly prescribed,
the ordinance will be better able to withstand a challenge of being
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. The failure to adopt clear
and reasonable standards may pose several problems of constitu-
tional magnitude. One obvious problem that may result from the
failure to provide adequate standards is that it leaves the applica-
tion of the ordinance to the whim and discretion of local officials
and, thus, may be found unreasonable." A second problem arises
when the standards are so inadequate or vague that the developer
does not know whether his plans are in compliance with the ordi-
nance.97 Finally, there may also be problems when the local legisla-
tive branch attempts to delegate some of its zoning powers to an
administrative agency such as a planning commission or architec-
tural review board; the failure of the legislative body to establish
clear and unambiguous standards which the administrative agency
must follow in order to carry out the intent of the ordinance may
result in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
The most fertile area of aesthetic regulation for standards
problems to arise appears to be the area of architectural review of
proposed buildings. For example, in Hankins v. Borough of
Rockleigh," the borough passed two ordinances which related to
architectual design and review, the first 00 of which restricted the
95. See, e.g., City of Champaign v. Kroger Co., 410 N.E.2d 661, 669 (II. App. Ct.
1980)("while public health, safety and morals ... submit to reasonable definition and de-
limitation, the realm of the aesthetic varies with the wide variation of taste and cultures");
Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (II. 1932)(argument that aesthetic regulations could
not be reduced to objective criteria was held inapplicable to ordinances restricting the size
and location of signs because such ordinances could be "as clear and definite as zoning ordi-
nances lacking an aesthetic purpose").
96. Board of Commissioners v. A.S. Pater Realty Co., 179 A.2d 169, 172 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1962) (ordinance gave board of commissioners power to grant or refuse billboard
permits in an arbitrary manner).
97. Morristown Road Assocs. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 394 A.2d 157, 163 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1978) (architectural review standards so vague that builder could not deter-
mine if his plans were conforming).
98. State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze, 342 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (dictum indi-
cating legislative power to zone could not be delegated); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley,
458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (plaintiff's argument that delegation was unconstitutional was
rejected).
99. 150 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
100. The ordinance read in pertinent part-
Article III
Section 7(g): Architectural Design-The architectural design of all new houses and
other buildings in the Borough of Rockleigh, or old houses or buildings that may
be renovated or reconstructed, shall be subject to the approval of the Planning
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style of new houses to an early American design and the second of
which effectively prohibited structures with flat roofs. On appeal,
plaintiffs claimed that "the ordinance's 'acceptable to' phrase con-
fers an unfettered discretion upon borough officials,"'10 and that
the term "early American" was so ambiguous that it "could be con-
strued as authorizing a tepee, adobe, log cabin, Cape Cod, New
England, Dutch colonial, or Pennsylvania Dutch architectural de-
sign.' 10 2 The court found it unnecessary to rule on either of these
assertions, choosing to strike down the ordinance as clearly unrea-
sonable in light of existing development in the borough, much of
which already had flat-roofed structures. 03
Two early cases which appeared to set the polestars for architec-
tural review ordinances are City of West Palm Beach v. State ex
rel. Duffey' 0' and State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v.
Wieland. 05 At issue in both cases was the validity of ordinances I"
requiring proposed buildings to be substantially similar in archi-
tectural design to existing buildings in the neighborhood. However,
the Florida Supreme Court in West Palm Beach struck down the
ordinance as having standards so uncertain as to be subject to the
"whim or caprice" of the administrative body, while the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Saveland Park upheld the ordinance despite the
existence of some discretionary power in the board. Aside from the
obvious difference in courts, the chief difference between the ordi-
nance at issue in West Palm Beach and that in Saveland Park
appears to be the existence of a direct tie to property values in the
Saveland Park ordinance. According to the rationale used by the
Board and of the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Rockleigh. Such design
may be of early American, or of other architectural style conforming with the ex-
isting residential architecture and with the rural surroundings in the Borough, and
acceptable to the Planning Board and to the Mayor and Council of the Borough of
Rockleigh.
150 A.2d at 64.
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
104. 30 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1947).
105. 69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
106. The ordinance at issue in West Palm Beach required that the "completed appear-
ance of every new building or structure must substantially equal that of adjacent buildings
or structures in said subdivision in appearance, square foot area and height." 30 So. 2d at
492. The ordinance at issue in Saveland Park required that "the exterior architectural ap-
peal and functional plan of the proposed structure will. . . not be so at variance with ...
structures already constructed or in the course of construction in the immediate neighbor-
hood . . . as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property values of said neighbor-
hood." 69 N.W.2d at 219.
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Wisconsin court, impact on property values appears to be an ade-
quate standard by which the board could base its decision; on the
other hand, the West Palm Beach ordinance tied evaluation to
such factors as floor area, height, number of rooms, and cost, and
these factors were not considered sufficient grounds to evaluate
proposed dwellings. Interestingly, these latter factors are easier to
document than the effect of a proposed building on property val-
ues; 107 nonetheless, the ordinance was upheld in Wisconsin but not
in Florida. 0 8
In addition to the failure to promulgate aesthetic standards that
are adequate and can be applied in a non-arbitrary manner, a
question also can arise regarding the ability of a local legislative
body to delegate its powers to an administrative agency. Such was
the case in State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze,10 ' which also deter-
mined the validity of an ordinance requiring architectural review
for harmony and compatibility with existing buildings. The court
held the ordinance invalid as being exercised primarily for aes-
thetic purposes, but then went on to indicate in dictum that the
statutory grant of power to zone had been made to the legislative
arm of the city and could not be delegated to an architectural re-
view board. Only nine years later, the supreme court of Missouri in
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley'" overlooked the dictum in
107. See generally Rowlett, supra note 5, at 622-33.
108. By 1978, architectural review ordinances had become more sophisticated, but the
issues regarding standards were about the same and the distinction made above between
West Palm Beach and Saveland Park still appeared to be valid. In Morristown Road As-
socs. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 394 A.2d 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), another
ordinance requiring site plan review of proposed buildings in order to insure harmony with
existing buildings was construed. Plaintiff argued that the standards in the ordinance such
as "harmoniously" and "similarity" were so vague that he was unable to determine whether
his building design would be conforming. The borough, on the other hand, contended that
the standards in the ordinance were "as precise as the subject matter of the regulation per-
mits," id. at 160, and, therefore, were not unreasonable. The court distinguished between
cases like West Palm Beach and those like Saveland Park, the latter of which upheld simi-
lar standards because of their link to the protection of property values. However, the court
felt that the ordinance at issue in Morristown was more similar to that in West Palm Beach,
and could not be upheld:
The basic criterion for design review under the ordinance is harmony with ex-
isting structures and terrain. This standard does not adequately circumscribe the
process of administrative decision nor does it provide an understandable criterion
for judicial review. It vests the design review committee, as well as the planning
board, with too broad a discretion, and permits determinations based upon whim,
caprice or subjective considerations.
Id. at 163.
109. 342 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
110. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
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Magidson and recognized a broad exception to the general rule
preventing the delegation of zoning powers to an administrative
body. The court reasoned that the ordinance will be upheld against
claims of unlawful delegation
in situations and circumstances where necessity would require the
vesting of discretion in the officer charged with the enforcement
of an ordinance, as where it would be either impracticable or im-
possible to fix a definite rule or standard, or where the discretion
vested in the officer relates to the enforcement of a police regula-
tion requiring prompt exercise of judgment."'
Although architectural or design review ordinances appear to be
the most prolific source of problems regarding the adequacy of aes-
thetic standards, such problems are not unknown to other types of
aesthetic regulation. For example, in Board of Commissioners v.
A.S. Pater Realty Co., Inc.,'12 plaintiff challenged the validity of
an ordinance s which required billboards greater than a specified
size to meet with the approval of the board of village commission-
ers. The court noted that the ordinance provided no guidelines or
standards by which the board was to evaluate these larger bill-
boards and, thus, delegated to the board the power "to grant or
refuse billboard permits in an arbitrary and capricious fashion." ''
Interestingly, the court went on to indicate that the village could
have instituted a complete prohibition of signs over the size
specified.
Of course, the issue of adequate standards only arises when the
regulation reserves a certain amount of discretionary power with
111. Id. at 311, quoting, State ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. 1957).
The court further distinguished the ordinance at issue here from that in Magidson in that it
contained safeguarding procedures for public hearings and appeals to city council by an
aggrieved party.
112. 179 A.2d 169 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962).
113. Section 8(A)(2) of the zoning ordinance provided:
No sign or billboard over 12 square feet shall be permitted in District "C" nor
over 30 square feet in Districts "D" and "E" that is not incidental to the uses of
the property on which it is located and that is not a part of or entirely supported
by a building, except upon application to and with the written consent of the
Board of Commissioners.
Such application shall be accompanied by a sketch of the proposed sign or bill-
board showing its size and structure, and its location with respect to property
lines, street junctions or intersections, and distances from adjacent buildings,
structures and other signs or billboards. No fees shall be charged for such permit.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 172.
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the local governmental body to approve or disapprove certain
structures or uses. When the ordinance contemplates a total prohi-
bition of a certain activity, the problem of adequate standards be-
comes moot. Instead, the focus of the court shifts to another prob-
lem of at least equal significance: whether the regulation has
effected a taking of private property for which the owner must be
compensated. One aspect of this problem is discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
C. Amortization and Compensation
Once an aesthetic problem such as billboards has been identi-
fied, a typical method of providing for the elimination of the prob-
lem is to (1) proscribe future engagement in the unaesthetic activ-
ity, and (2) set a reasonable period during which existing
unaesthetic uses and structures must be removed. This latter re-
quirement, generally referred to as the amortization of noncon-
forming uses,115 has been used successfully to require the removal
of existing unaesthetic structures such as billboards.1 6 However, it
is not without its problems. Of primary concern is whether requir-
ing the removal of existing billboards or other structures within a
specified period is a taking for which the owner must be
compensated. 117
The basic idea of proscribing the future erection of unaesthetic
structures and requiring the removal of existing structures within a
specified period of time does not, in itself, appear to constitute a
taking. Such restrictions do not mandate that the owner yield his
115. Ordinances which proscribe unaesthetic structures at certain locations essentially
make such structures nonconforming uses at those locations. Therefore, the law pertaining
to the amortization and removal of nonconforming uses generally appears applicable to the
removal of billboards and other unaesthetic structures under these ordinances. See Annot.,
22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968).
116. While the discussion presented here on amortization of nonconforming uses is illus-
trated primarily with cases involving billboard and sign ordinances, it could also apply to
the amortization of fences, open storage of recreational vehicles, and many other unaesthetic
uses.
117. State statutes passed in response to the federal Highway Beautification Act (also
referred to as the "Ladybird Act"), 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976), provide compensation for law-
fully erected signs which are removed pursuant to the federal act and state laws passed
subsequent thereto. The act requires that states provide for "effective control of the erec-
tion and maintenance along the Interstate System and the primary system of outdoor adver-
tising signs, displays and devices" and provides for the loss of ten percent of the state's
federal-aid highway funds for failure to do so. Compensation for removed billboards is pro-
vided on a 75%-25% federal-state split. Of course, the act does not speak to local ordi-
nances requiring the removal of billboards.
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property for any particular use, such as a park,"1 ' which will not
allow him to utilize his property in an advantageous manner. On
the contrary, providing a reasonable amortization period in which
to remove a billboard or other unaesthetic structure allows an own-
er "an opportunity to recoup his investment and avoid substantial
financial loss."" ' As such, it appears to be a legitimate method of
accomplishing aesthetic objectives which will benefit the entire
community without inflicting a great private loss.
As a general rule, most regulations requiring the removal of non-
conforming structures or uses which provide a reasonable amorti-
zation period should withstand a constitutional challenge based on
the prohibition on taking private property. 20 Thus, the question
most often addressed is whether the amortization period is a rea-
sonable one. In this regard, the courts have found it necessary to
make a distinction between regulations enacted to remove bill-
boards for safety reasons and those enacted for aesthetic reasons.
The public benefit gained from enacting a regulation for aesthetics
is not considered nearly so great as a regulation enacted for safety.
This difference is so great, in fact, that safety concerns may neces-
sitate the immediate removal of an offending billboard, while an
ordinance requiring immediate removal for aesthetic reasons would
surely require compensation. 2"
When removal is based solely on aesthetic concerns, the length
of the amortization period is, of course, a very important factor.
Courts have upheld amortization periods ranging in length from
118. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976).
119. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (1977), appeal dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978).
120. Id. at 367.
121. Id. at 366. The court observed:
Certainly, a billboard which serves as a menace to the safety of motorists should
be removed without delay. In such a case, the public benefit gained by immediate
implementation of an exercise of the police power far outweighs the concomitant
financial injury suffered by the affected billboard and property owners. In contrast
to a safety-motivated exercise of the police power, a regulation enacted to enhance
the aesthetics of a community generally does not provide a compelling reason for
immediate implementation with respect to existing structures or uses.
Id. This distinction surfaced clearly in the ordinance at issue in Art Neon Co. v. City &
County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974), which
provided an amortization period of up to five years for general nonconforming signs but only
a period of thirty days for removal of signs posing a safety risk. The court rationalized that,
due to "the extreme character of these signs, with the demonstrated relationship to safety,
we must hold the method and the time to be reasonable." Id. at 123.
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one year to ten years.12 However, this does not mean that any spe-
cific amortization period will be reasonable for all signs even
within the same jurisdiction. Of note in this regard is National Ad-
vertising Co. v. County of Monterey,12 where the county's zoning
ordinance rendered forty-two of plaintiff's signs nonconforming
and subject to removal within one year. The court noted that
thirty-one of these signs had been fully depreciated for federal in-
come tax purposes, but that the remaining eleven signs would not
be fully depreciated for several years. Therefore, the court held the
one-year amortization period reasonable as to the thirty-one fully
depreciated signs, but decided that removal of the other eleven
should wait until expiration of a more reasonable period in which
to allow plaintiff to recover their original cost.
As Monterey seems to indicate, a critical factor in the reasona-
bleness of the length of the amortization period is its relation to
the owner's financial investment; the court concluded that "as the
financial investment increases in dimension, the length of the
amortization period should correspondingly increase." ' 4 It does
not appear as though the owner must be given enough time to
recoup his entire investment, but the period "should not be so
short as to result in a substantial loss of his investment. ' 12 5 In
making this evaluation, it is necessary to look at the facts of each
particular case."' In making the determination of whether the
amortization period is reasonable in light of the owner's invest-
ment, the courts have found it useful to analyze these factors: (1)
the initial cost of the billboard, (2) its present depreciated value,
(3) its remaining useful life, (4) the existence of a lease obligation,
and (5) the investment realization to date.1 27
Equally important are factors which courts have refused to con-
sider in evaluating the reasonableness of the amortization period.
122. Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (five-year amortization
period); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1-4 years), rev'd on other
grounds, 453 U.S. 490; National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577
(one year), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970); Murphy, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
161 A.2d 185 (Conn. 1960) (2 years); Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond
Beach, 415 So.2d 1312 (10 years); Webster Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, 256
So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (5 years); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 402
N.Y.S.2d 359 (61/2 years), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978).
123. 83 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970).
124. 402 N.Y.S.2d at 367. See also Metromedia, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (amortization pe-
riod must be commensurate with owner's investment).
125. 402 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
126. Id. at 367; 164 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
127. 164 Cal. Rptr. 510; 402 N.Y.S.2d 359.
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For example, in Monterey, the court refused to recognize the ex-
tended life of the billboard which may result from performing es-
sential maintenance and repairs, noting that "repairs cannot be re-
lied upon to defeat zoning legislation which looks to the future and
the eventual liquidation of nonconforming uses.'""" And in Art
Neon, the court refused to uphold a provision of the ordinance es-
tablishing different amortization periods for signs based upon their
replacement value. 129 "The replacement cost of the signs is not re-
lated to any of the relevant factors in the reasonableness tests, and
presents no valid basis for different treatment of different signs
ranging from three to five years."18 0 Therefore, the court severed
this part of the ordinance and held the remaining five year limit to
be a valid amortization period.
There also appears to be certain situations in which neither com-
pensation nor a reasonable amortization period is required to en-
force the removal of nonconforming billboards. This occurs when
(1) the billboard has been unlawfully erected, and (2) the bill-
board, although erected lawfully, is subject to removal at any time
at the owner's expense.
With regard to the former situation, it has been recognized that
compensation is not constitutionally mandated for the removal of a
sign which was erected unlawfully, as when the billboard was er-
ected after passage of a state law prohibiting such signs."' Simi-
larly, when the state's department of commerce was supposed to
promulgate regulations to implement that state law but failed to
do so, the court held that it was necessary for the owner to obtain
a judicial determination of whether the sign was erected in an ap-
propriate area; because the owner failed to obtain such a determi-
nation prior to erection of his sign, the sign was found to have been
unlawfully erected and no compensation was required upon its
128. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
129. Section 613.5-5(4) of the Denver zoning ordinance provided for amortization peri-
ods of 2 to 5 years based upon replacemeht value of the sign, as follows:
Replacement Value Amortization Period
$0 to $3,000 2 years
3,001 to 6,000 3 years
6,001 to 15,000 4 years
15,001 or more 5 years
488 F.2d at 120.
130. Id. at 122.
131. Hiway Ads, Inc. v. State, 356 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App. 1977). See also La Pointe
Outdoor Advertising v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 398 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1981).
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removal. 13 1
It also appears that the right to compensation or a reasonable
period of abatement can be effectively waived or negated if the
billboard permit so specifies. In National Advertising Co. v.
State," the court held that the state was not required to compen-
sate owners for removal of their billboards because the permit to
erect the boards specified that it could be revoked at any time and
the billboard removed at owner's expense. A similar holding was
made in Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle'" even though a state law
had been enacted requiring compensation for the removal of all
lawfully erected billboards.
Generally, it appears as though requiring the removal of existing
billboards and similar structures can be accomplished without re-
sulting in a taking, provided the forced removal is not character-
ized as unjust or unreasonable. In this regard, it may be necessary
to provide owners with a fairly lengthy amortization period during
which they can recoup some of their investment, or else the private
loss suffered by the owner may be said to outweigh the benefit
gained by the public. However, such attempts to require removal
should be buoyed by two legal realities: (1) laws which provide a
significant period of amortization will have a presumption of rea-
sonableness and should be able to pass constitutional muster, and
(2) it will be up to the plaintiff to show that the amortization pe-
riod is unreasonable in light of the facts of each case. 35 As the
cases have apparently shown, these realities significantly increase
the survival rate of ordinances and other regulations requiring the
removal of nonconforming unaesthetic structures.
V. CONCLUSION
Several summary observations may be made regarding the pre-
sent state of zoning for aesthetics. First, it appears that a trend has
been developing in recent years whereby states have expressed
greater acceptance of aesthetics as a basis for land use regulation.
A new majority of states now recognize that an ordinance based
primarily on aesthetics is presumptively valid.'$ Second, in lieu of
discussing the propriety of using the police power to zone for aes-
132. State v. National Advertising Co., 356 So. 2d 557 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
133. 571 P.2d 1194 (N.M. 1977).
134. 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979).
135. Metromedia, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510.
136. Bufford, supra note 27.
REASONABLENESS OF AESTHETIC ZONING
thetics, the focus of the courts appears to be shifting to an evalua-
tion of the impact of aesthetic regulation on private property
rights, including the developer's reasonable expectations of invest-
ment. Third, this shift in the focus of the courts appears to be an
appropriate one, particularly since the validity of land use regula-
tions has traditionally hinged on a balancing of public benefits
against private restraints."' It is not difficult to see now that the
promotion of aesthetics can have a positive impact on the general
welfare; the more difficult problem is how to weigh these positive
impacts and balance them with the negative restrictions placed on
property owners and developers.
The fourth and final observation to be made here is that the
recognition of aesthetics as a legitimate concern of the police
power, and the subsequent focus on the reasonableness of aesthetic
regulations, is a shift that may benefit both private property own-
ers and local governments wanting to regulate in the name of aes-
thetics. Local governments obviously will benefit from the pre-
sumption of validity which will attach to aesthetic regulations. But
private property owners also may benefit from recent trends in ju-
dicial attitudes towards aesthetic zoning. Recognition of aesthetics
as a legitimate end of the police power means that courts, and local
governments, may no longer feel obligated to justify aesthetic regu-
lations on the basis of some tenuous or unprovable relationship to
a more traditional police power objective. Further, when a court
goes on to balance the public benefits and private restraints of an
aesthetic regulation without considering these tenuous non-aes-
thetic benefits, it may find that the aesthetic benefits are not suffi-
cient to allow very substantial restrictions on private property, free
speech, or reasonable investment expectations.
137. R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.25, at 596; A. RATHKOPF, supra note 1, § 14.01, at
14.16.
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